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Abstract

In a recent demonstration project, Florida Medicaid enrollees were required to pick a
managed care plan that was either a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) or a Provider
Service Network (PSN). PSNs are a form of managed care very similar to Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs) that provides health care services directly through a provider or network
of organizations to a defined population without a “middle man” such as a third party insurance
company and health plan. There are two types of PSNs: Physician-based PSNs and Healthcare
system-based PSNs. Physician-based PSNs are created and controlled by physicians groups.
Healthcare system-based PSNs are based on safety net hospitals and their outpatient clinics.
Health system-based PSNs are integrated delivery systems, which are organizations that combine
healthcare providers into one organization and may provide more efficient care with lower cost
of care due to economies of scale. The objective of this study was to examine the differences in
healthcare expenditures by enrollees in physician-based and health system-based PSNs. Using a
difference in difference approach our study found that compared to enrollees in physician-based
PSNs, enrollees in health system-based PSNs lowered expenditures to a greater extent over time
compared to physician-based PSNs. Findings from this study provide important information to
states considering implementing alternative delivery models to control Medicaid costs.
Key words: Medicaid, Managed Care, Provider Service Networks, Accountable Care
Organizations, Expenditures
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Introduction
Medicaid is administered by individual states under broad federal guidelines, with the
federal government reimbursing each state for a portion of the costs. The program constitutes
approximately 8 percent of total federal government spending, while states spend an average of
24.5 percent of their budget on Medicaid (Kenen, 2012; National Association of State Budget
Officers, 2014; Sommers et al., 2010). Economic recession and rising healthcare costs combined
with Medicaid expansion under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, 2010)
have placed significant burdens on state budgets. This has caused many states to create strategies
designed to improve the efficiency of their Medicaid programs (Kenen, 2012). Florida is one of
several states that remodeled their Medicaid program into a managed care structure in an effort
to improve efficiency in the provision of healthcare services and reduce expenditures. Medicaid
managed care organizations are created to improve access to care for Medicaid beneficiaries and
to slow the growth in Medicaid expenditures (Halstead et al., 1998; Holahan et al., 1998). The
general difference between Medicaid managed care and Medicaid Fee-for-Service (FFS) was
that Medicaid enrollees in managed care are more likely to have a primary care provider, less
likely to use hospital care, emergency room, have prescription drugs, and be referred to
specialists, and more likely to be satisfied with their cares than Medicaid beneficiaries in
Medicaid FFS (Kirby et al., 2003; Sisk et al., 1995).

The Florida Medicaid Reform Demonstration was approved by the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services on October 19, 2005 and implemented in Broward and Duval counties
starting July 1, 2006. The aims of this program were to increase Medicaid enrollees’
empowerment and responsibility, increase market competition through choice of health plans,
and to improve enrollee health status by providing financial incentives for their healthy behavior
(Coughlin et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2013; Harman et al., 2011; Landry et al., 2011). Under the
Florida Medicaid Reform Demonstration, Medicaid beneficiaries living in the participating
counties were required to choose their health plan between private Provider Service Networks
(PSNs) or Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).

Among Medicaid managed care service networks, Provider Service Networks (PSNs) are
provider-led organizations whose goals are to eliminate costs of third party health plans, to
manage healthcare expenditures without having to reduce needed care, and to improve overall
quality of care using a shared savings model (Duncan et al., 2007; Hall et al., 2013; Johnson et
al., 2010; Schiller et al., 2010; The Florida Statues, 2012). That is, healthcare providers will
deliver care to beneficiaries efficiently through a coordinated continuum of care in PSNs (Davis,
1997; Schiller et al., 2010). PSNs are all not-for-profit entities owned by physician-only or health
systems, including physicians, hospitals, and other healthcare providers and operated only in
Florida, although the delivery model used by PSNs in Florida are essentially the same as
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) that are operating in other states. Previous research
examining PSNs from an earlier demonstration found that PSNs had lower spending that
appeared to be largely due to reductions in office visits and prescription drugs compared to
HMOs, primary care case management and fee-for service plans (Lemak et al., 2005; Johnson et
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al., 2010; Vogel et al., 2004). Since PSNs showed promise in the earlier Medicaid demonstration,
they were offered as option to beneficiaries in the Demonstration beginning in 2006. After the
first four years of this Demonstration, Medicaid beneficiaries in PSNs had overall lower
expenditures relative to those in HMOs (Harman et al., 2014).

There are two different organizational types of PSNs: physician-based PSNs (P-PSNs)
and health system-based PSNs (H-PSNs) as shown in Table 1.
Table1. Characteristics of Physician-based and Health System-based PSNs
Physician-based
Health SystemHMOs
PSNs
based PSNs
Financial Mechanism
Fee-for-Services
Fee-for-Services
Payments
and Shared
and Shared
Capitation
Savings model
Savings model

MediPass
(PCCM)
Per member
per month
(PMPM)

Managerial Structure
Reform counties
Area Served
Geographic
Orientation

Yes
Florida only
Local and
Regional

Yes
Florida only

Ownership

Not-for-profit

Not-for-profit

For-profit/
For-profit/
Not-for-profit Not-for-profit

Medicaid only

Diversified,
Medicaid,
Govt payers

Mission

Medicaid only

Local

Yes
Multi-state
Local and
Regional

No
Multi-state
Local and
Regional

Medicaid
only

Organizational Structure
Provider-led

Physician network Health system

Primary care medial
home base

Yes

No

Primary care
physicians
No

Yes

P-PSNs and H-PSNs were formed by large physician group practices and safety net
hospitals (Davis, 1997; Duncan et al., 2007; Landry et al., 2011; Lemak et al., 2004; Johnson et
al., 2010; Schiller et al., 2010). Providers in both types of PSNs receive fee-for-service (FFS)
payment but qualify to share in any savings resulting from cost reduction and meeting
predetermined performance and utilization targets (Hall et al., 2013; Schiller et al., 2010; The
Florida Statutes, 2012). However, organizational structures may be different depending on who
will lead these organizations. P-PSNs are a physician-only network created and controlled
mainly by physicians groups that provide healthcare services to Medicaid enrollees from
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Demonstration counties. P-PSNs have a horizontal organizational structure, in that they only
incorporate healthcare workers that provide services at one level of the patient care continuum.
This is in contrast to H-PSNs, which are a network of healthcare providers that operate through
safety net hospitals and their affiliated physician groups, outpatient clinics, and ambulatory care
centers. PSNs are very similar in structure and aim to Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs)
that were created and spread after the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.
Determining which model is most effective was identified as one of the pressing questions that
needs to be answered during a roundtable discussion of ACOs (Lee et al., 2010). This study
provides evidence highlighting the differences in expenditures between these two types of
organizations four years after implementation.

Differences in expenditures between P-PSNs and H-PSNs are expected due to differences
in levels of integration between these two organizational forms. This structural approach allows
for more resources, including electronic medical records, healthcare providers, and quality
improvement activities among H-PSNs compared to P-PSNs. For this reason, more integrated
organizations are more likely to redesign care processes, take advantages of economies of scale,
and make the changes needed to improve care than less integrated organizations (Crosson, 2005;
Shortell et al., 2008). Therefore, we hypothesized Medicaid beneficiaries in H-PSNs will have
lower healthcare expenditures compared to Medicaid beneficiaries in P-PSNs.

Data and Methods
Analytic Strategy
To minimize selection bias and issues related to unobserved confounding, we used a
difference-in-difference approach, with a person-month as the observational unit for
expenditures. The analyses used Florida Medicaid claims data from the two fiscal years
immediately preceding the Demonstration (FY0405 and FY0506), and the first four fiscal years
after implementation of the Demonstration (FY0607 through FY0910). The difference-indifference approach assessed changes in expenditures before and after implementation of the
Demonstration between H-PSNs and P-PSNs. Data from beneficiaries in MediPass, a primary
care case management program, was used for the pre-Demonstration period because PSNs did
not exist in Broward and Duval counties prior to the Demonstration but services were paid for on
a fee-for-service (FFS) basis in both PSNs and in MediPass. Claims data from all Medicaid
beneficiaries from Broward and Duval counties (Demonstration counties) who were enrolled in
one of the two types of PSNs after the policy change (P-PSNs: N= 838,254 person months and
H-PSNs: N=1,073,434 person months) and from beneficiaries in MediPass before the policy
implementation (N=2,544,281 person months) was used in the expenditures analyses. Because
we are interested in understanding differences in the population average per member per month
expenditures over time between the two types of PSNs, the analytic approach did not model
individual changes in expenditures pre- and post-implementation, but simply the average
expenditures for all beneficiaries in the pre-period vs. the post-period. Additionally, examining
individual changes over time would also significantly limit the scope of the analysis, and thus the
generalizability, as the analysis would have to be limited to Medicaid beneficiaries with
continuous Medicaid eligibility over a six-year period if this approach was taken.
5

Measures
The primary independent variable of interest was a binary indicator variable for whether
the beneficiary was enrolled in an H-PSN vs. P-PSN. Beneficiaries who selected HMOs were
removed from the analysis because the aim of this study is to compare the two organizational
forms of PSNs. The dependent variable was per member per month (PMPM) expenditures.
Monthly expenditures were calculated by summing all paid claims during a calendar month,
including monthly administrative management fees. Covariates included age, gender,
race/ethnicity, geographic location, eligibility status (TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families) vs. SSI (Supplemental Security Income)), and risk scores. Risk scores were calculated
using the Medicaid Rx methodology, which measures health status using pharmacy claims
(http://medicaidrx.ucsd.edu/), to account for any difference in the health status of the populations
that selected to enroll in P-PSNs vs. H-PSNs. The Florida Agency for Healthcare Administration
(AHCA) used the Medicaid Prescription Drug risk adjustment model to calculate risk scores to
risk-adjust premiums for each HMO and PSN recipient. Medicaid Prescription Drug risk
adjustment model was used to expect enrollees’ diagnosed diseases and calculate risk score
based on enrollee’s prescription drug list. Although, PSNs were paid on a fee-for-service (FFS)
basis during the entirety of the study period examined here, risk scores were still calculated
because the original plans for the demonstration were to eventually move PSNs over to a
capitated payment model. Everyone starts in the same population in the pre-period because
neither type of PSNs were implemented at that point, so there is no difference in risk for this
period and therefore risk scores were set to zero for all observations in the pre-period. This is the
same approach used in previous studies examining this population (Harman et al, 2011; Harman
et al 2014). We used data from FY0405 and 0506 as baseline and data from FY0607 to 0910 as
follow-up.

Statistical Approach
Previous analyses of expenditures using the same dataset demonstrated that Generalized
Estimating Equations (GEE) using a gamma family displayed adequate model fit (Harman et al,
2011; Harman et al, 2014). Therefore, a GEE using a gamma family with a log link was used to
estimate the difference in PMPM expenditures between H-PSNs and P-PSNs. The estimated
equation is:
PMPM Expenditures = exp [β0 + β1*Time + β2*Post + β3*HPSN + β4*(Time *Post) +
β5*(Time*Post*HPSN) + β6*Covariates + ε],
where β3 represents the difference in the intercept for the period after the Medicaid reform for
observations from H-PSNs compared to observations from P-PSNs. β5 is the difference in the
change in the slope pre- and post-policy implementation between H-PSNs and P-PSNs and
represents the estimated marginal difference in expenditures over time between H-PSNs and PPSNs, and is the primary coefficient of interest, as it demonstrates whether H-PSNs or P-PSNs
were better able to control expenditures over time.
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Results
Descriptive Analysis
MediPass enrollees before the reform period contributed 2,544,281 member months.
Over half of these enrollees were male (54.05%) and lived in Broward County (57.60%). Almost
half of MediPass enrollees were African-American (47.48%) while most beneficiaries were
enrolled through TANF (84.52%). Since risk scores were not calculated before the demonstration
period, these values were not available for MediPass beneficiaries. Therefore, scores for these
enrollees were assigned a baseline value of 0 at baseline (average risk). P-PSNs and H-PSNs
contributed 838,254 and 1,073,434 member months respectively. Over half of the beneficiaries
in these plans were female (53.94% and 56.13%), African-American (51.94% and 59.52%), and
were enrolled in TANF (85.24% and 81.73%). Enrollees in H-PSNs were older compared to PPSNs (17.68 vs. 14.95) and had lower risk scores (0.10 vs. 0.12). Also, more enrollees in HPSNs lived in Duval County, while more enrollees in P-PSNs lived in Broward County.

Table 2. Sample characteristics

Age
<1
1-5
6-13
14-20
21-54
55-64
>65

Pre-reform
MediPass
(N=2,544,281)
13.34
10.91%
26.95%
28.25%
14.58%
16.19%
2.71%
0.36%

Post-reform
P-PSNs
H-PSNs
(N=838,254)
(N=1,073,434)
14.95
17.68
3.76%
3.85%
22.31%
16.50%
32.62%
31.71%
20.93%
19.66%
17.29%
23.91%
2.67%
3.91%
0.33%
0.30%

Gender
Female
Male
Race/Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic
Other
County
Duval
Broward
Eligibility Status
SSI
TANF
Risk score

45.95%
54.05%

53.94%
46.06%

56.13%
43.87%

23.84%
47.48%
15.84%
12.84%

20.61%
51.94%
16.87%
10.47%

19.55%
59.52%
11.87%
8.95%

42.39%
57.60%

35.42%
64.58%

57.59%
42.41%

15.48%
84.52%
0

14.76%
85.24%
0.12

18.27%
81.73%
0.10
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Multivariate Analysis
The results of the GEE model of PMPM expenditures are shown in Table 3. The
coefficient for Time × Post × HPSN was -0.0180 (p <0.001). This indicates that PMPM
expenditures for enrollees in H-PSNs decreased by 1.80% every month relative to expenditures
for those in P-PSNs. The coefficient for health system-based PSNs (HPSN) was 0.9726
(p<0.001). This indicates that H-PSN enrollee PMPM expenditures were higher on average
during the Medicaid Demonstration compared to P-PSN enrollees. Therefore, while PMPM
expenditures for enrollees in H-PSNs were higher on average during the Demonstration period,
their expenditures are trending lower over time relative to beneficiaries in P-PSNs, indicating
that H-PSNs reduce expenditures to a greater extent over time.

Table 3. GEE model of PMPM expenditures
Estimate
S.E.
Time
-0.0061
0.0009
Post-reform
-2.0935
0.0438
HPSN
0.9726
0.0572
Time × Post
0.0492
0.0013
Time × Post × HPSN
-0.0180
0.0012
Age
0.0068
0.0005
Gender
(Female)
Male
-0.0539
0.0118
Race/ethnicity
(White)
Black
-0.2715
0.0782
Hispanic
-0.2318
0.0793
Other
-0.2116
0.0814
County
(Broward)
Duval
-0.1388
0.0124
Eligibility
(SSI)
TANF
-1.5720
0.0208
Risk score
0.1180
0.0053

95% Confidence limits
-0.0079
-0.0043
-2.1793
-2.0077
0.8604
1.0848
0.0466
0.0517
-0.0203
-0.0157
0.0058
0.0078

Pr > |Z|
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

-0.0770

-0.0307

<.0001

-0.4248
-0.3873
-0.3711

-0.1182
-0.0763
-0.520

0.0005
0.0035
0.0093

-0.1632

-0.1145

<.0001

-1.6128
0.1015

-1.5312
0.1221

<.0001
<.0001
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Conclusion and Discussion
The Florida Medicaid Reform Demonstration program introduced PSNs as an option in
Medicaid managed care to provide enrollees with a broader choice of health plans. This study
focused on the two different types of PSNs. Controlling for enrollees’ socio-demographic factors,
expenditures for H-PSNs declined at a greater rate compared to expenditures for P-PSN enrollees,
suggesting that H-PSNs can better control expenditures than P-PSNs. Even though the
population that selected H-PSNs tended to have higher expenditures to begin with, PMPM
expenditures will be lower for beneficiaries in H-PSNs versus those in P-PSNs by the 55th
month of the demonstration, assuming the observed trend continues. This number was calculated
by dividing the H-PSN coefficient (0.9726) by the rate of decline per month (-0.0180).

The findings of this study indicate the level of integration is a potential source of the
variation in healthcare expenditures, but some limitations and other important factors need to be
considered. It will be important to monitor the impact of integration over time as many hospitals
are positioning themselves to become integrated systems, joining forces and purchasing
physician practices, leaving fewer independent hospitals and physicians. Greater market share
may give these health systems more market control, which may drive up expenditures over time.
Additionally, differences in expenditures could stem from enrollees in H-PSNs potentially
having higher health care needs that the risk scores could not completely account for. These
reasons can explain average higher expenditures in H-PSNs after reform. However, given that
the trends in expenditures for enrollees in H-PSNs were decreasing at a greater rate over time
compared to PSNs, this suggests that H-PSNs may be more likely to better control costs, and
overall savings can be achieved over longer periods of time. The effect of the level of integration
may not be immediate and its influence on healthcare expenditures could take time to have an
effect. It is possible that H-PSNs provide greater preventive care than P-PSNs, which incurs
greater upfront costs but may reduce the need for expensive acute care services in the long run.
This result also may be associated with the different level of integration. H-PSNs which are more
integrated systems are available to align healthcare facilities, programs or services and offer a
coordinated continuum of care, resulting in reducing unnecessary expenditures. Possible factors
associated with differences in expenditures could include healthcare utilization, healthcare
providers’ attitudes, organizational culture, meaningful use of health information technology, HPSNs and P-PSNs penetration rates, number of H-PSNs and P-PSNs, and market competition of
Medicaid managed care markets, although this study did not directly test the influence of these
individual factors. Future studies should compare patterns of utilization to assess how reductions
in expenditures are achieved.

Some additional limitations that need to be acknowledged include the nonequivalentcomparison group study design. The study also used separate samples measured at two time
periods. Non-equivalent comparison groups and the different individuals in the pre- and postreform periods are susceptible to selection bias and threaten the internal validity of the study
results. However, we used the same inclusion and exclusion criteria for the study population to
minimize selection bias, used a difference-in-difference approach to measure the change in
outcome differences between the two groups to minimize the influence of unobserved
9

confounding, and included risk scores to help control for differences in health status between the
H-PSN and P-PSN post-implementation. An additional limitation is that this study only
examined expenditures for the first four years after implementation, so it is possible that
observed trends do not continue over time. Future studies should be conducted to assess
outcomes over a longer period of time.
Despite these limitations, this study provided empirical evidence regarding the
differences in healthcare expenditures between physician practice-based and hospital-based
organizations. Findings from this study can inform policymakers across the country regarding
different potential delivery models to implement for their Medicaid programs, particularly since
many states are considering implementing ACOs or organizations similar to ACOs such as the
PSNs in Florida. Shortell and Casalino (2008) introduced five different types of existing
organizations that could serve as an ACO, including multispecialty group practice, hospital
medical staff organization, physician-hospital organization, interdependent practice organization,
and health plan-provider network. This means ACOs are mainly controlled by physicians and
hospitals. Therefore, findings from this study can help inform whether there are advantages to
hospital-based ACOs that are centered in hospitals compared to physician-based ACOs in terms
of expenditures. However, the reason why more and less integrated delivery systems perform
differently is not clear and a topic of future investigations. It will be important to monitor the
different performance between physician-based and hospital-based organizations using more
data and a longer study period and to determine how these variations are being achieved.
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